Originally published as a Letter to the Editor in The
Washington Times, April 28, 1992I
believe I can resolve the debate on whether punishments like imprisonment and the death
penalty violate the unalienable rights to life and liberty (Letters, Shannon Johnson,
April 11, and Richard E. Shipman, March 21).
Actually, there is only one unalienable right:
the right to be free from aggression, the initiation of force. The unalienable rights to
life and liberty are two applications of that basic right. Murder is an initiation of
force against a person's life, kidnapping and slavery against a person's liberty, and
theft against a person's property. They have a common thread under justice: Such actions
entail an initiation of force against the person.
Defensive force is also force against another
person. However, it is not aggression but a response to it. When we kill attackers who
threaten our lives, we don't violate any unalienable right of theirs, for we are not
violating their right to be free from the initiation of force. Instead, we are protecting
our right to be free from that force. Similarly, punishment is a response to aggression,
not an initiation of force. Defense and punishment (commensurate with the aggression) do
not violate the aggressor's unalienable right to be free from the initiation of force.
Regarding the death penalty, Mr. Shipman
worried about imposing it upon innocent people. Mrs. Johnson replied, "Once the
verdict is given, the rights of law-abiding citizens must take precedence over the
supposed rights of the criminal." Mrs. Johnson misses the point. Corollary to the
unalienable right to be free from the initiation of force is the unalienable obligation
not to initiate force. Even if convicted, the innocent are not in fact criminals. Having
given them due process does not excuse us. By punishing them, we have not only violated
their unalienable right to be free from the initiation of force, we have violated our
obligation not to use such force.
We are not obligated under rights to impose
punishment; we are obligated to avoid aggression. If we imprison someone unjustly, we can
repay our debt to that person to some extent and beg forgiveness. But how do we compensate
the innocent dead? Given the fallibility of human beings, this is a fundamental ethical
problem for capital punishment.